The Strait of Malacca is the world’s most important oil chokepoint, carrying about 24–25% of global oil supply in recent years.
The Strait of Hormuz moves around 20–23% of global oil supply, making it the second-largest energy transit chokepoint.
The Cape of Good Hope carries about 9–10% of global oil flows, and its share tends to increase when other chokepoints face disruptions.
The Bab el-Mandeb saw a sharp drop in oil flow share from about 9% in 2023 to around 4% in 2024, reflecting security concerns affecting shipping in the Red Sea corridor.
Oil transported through the Suez Canal and the SUMED pipeline system dropped significantly after 2023, falling from about 8.6% to below 5%, showing how quickly routes shift during geopolitical tensions.
The Strait of Malacca’s share has remained consistently high and stable, indicating its structural importance to Asian energy demand.
Alternative routes like the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa are longer but strategically crucial, especially when Middle Eastern chokepoints become unstable.
DisCos billed approximately ₦1.49 trillion but collected only ₦1.12 trillion in H1 2025.
Ikeja and Eko DisCos generated the highest revenues, collecting ₦206.22 billion and ₦210.59 billion, respectively.
Revenue collection gaps remain significant, with Jos, Kaduna, and Yola posting the weakest collection performances.
The wide gap between billings and actual collections suggests persistent challenges in customer payment compliance, metering, and distribution efficiency.
South Africa dominates with 30 battery storage systems, the largest by far.
Egypt is the second-largest market with 7 projects, while Morocco has 4.
Nigeria and Senegal have five projects each (operational + pipeline).
Several countries, including Ghana, Togo, Angola, Botswana, DR Congo, and Mauritius, each have just one or two projects, indicating an uneven spread across the continent.
South Africa also leads in systems under construction (7).
Operational projects are still limited continent-wide, with most systems either under construction or in the planning pipeline.
Urban electricity access has remained between 80% and 89% since 1990, never crossing to 90%.
The inability to achieve universal access suggests that infrastructure expansion has struggled to keep pace with rapid urbanisation and population growth.
Periodic dips in access, such as in 2010 and 2015, point to challenges in maintaining consistent electricity supply rather than just extending connections.
Insufficient generation, outdated grids, and policy inefficiencies have constrained Nigeria’s ability to deliver reliable and universal electricity access even in its urban centres.
Rural electricity access increased from just 4% in 1990 to about 33% in 2023, showing gradual progress over three decades.
The data reveals irregular jumps in certain years—such as 2003, 2011, and 2016—likely tied to temporary electrification programmes or revised data estimates. D
espite improvements, nearly two-thirds of rural Nigerians still lack electricity, underscoring a wide disparity in energy access across regions.
The slow rate of expansion highlights ongoing issues with investment, grid extension, and maintenance that continue to limit rural electrification efforts.
